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The emergence of multinational firms from developing economies poses a quandary to 
international business scholars (Ramamurti 2009; Wells 2009). Some of the classic 
theories that helped justify the international expansion of (developed country) firms are 
questioned by the mere existence of the so-called emerging market multinational 
enterprises (EMNEs) (Heenan and Keegan 1979; Lall 1983; Wright, Filatotchev et al. 
2005; Mathews 2006; Ramamurti 2009) of which Latin American MNEs is an important 
subset. Much of the current knowledge on EMNEs stems from country-level studies. In 
these studies, aggregate levels of trade, foreign direct investment, and other macro 
magnitudes are analyzed (Kumar and McLeod 1981; Khanna and Palepu 2006; Fleury 
and Fleury 2009; Williamson and Zeng 2009) and the implications for EMNEs is 
subsequently hypothesized (OECD 2006). The present paper takes the opposite approach: 
from micro to macro. More concretely, we review the international expansion of one 
particular firm, CEMEX, which we deem representative of a subset of EMNEs, and then 
try to induce the general principles explaining the growth and sustainability of these 
firms. 
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The rapid and successful geographical expansion of CEMEX reveals a more complex 
story about the sources of EMNE competitiveness than usually told. We find that the 
structural characteristics of its domestic market, the most common explanation of EMNE 
success, certainly had a strong influence on the character of the company and its growth 
in foreign countries (Khanna and Palepu 2006). However, country of origin explanations 
alone fall very short of justifYing CEMEX's pattern of expansion, or why it is able to 
compete against first world firms whilst remaining, unequivocally, a Mexican company. 
Indeed, since the early 90s when it started its international expansion, this company's 
strategy has consisted in systematically standardizing, exploiting and enhancing the 
capabilities that where initially developed to respond to the competitive challenges of its 
home market. It is the explicit attention paid to capturing knowledge from newly acquired 
firms, evaluating its potential impact, and rolling it out to the rest of the organization that 
helps explain CEMEX's growth and position in its industry. 
Brief Theoretical Review 
Early theories of the multinational enterprise (MNE) in the 60s and 70s were developed 
in response to the reality those days: the overwhelming majority of firms venturing 
beyond their domestic country borders were headquartered either in the US, Western 
Europe or Japan. As a result, the explanations of observed patterns of international 
expansion emphasized existing differentials in the quality of the institutional environment 
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in home and host countries (Hymer 1960; Vernon 1966; Vernon 1971; Johanson and 
Vah1ne 1977). 
It would not be until the early 80s that some authors (Heenan and Keegan 1979; Lall 
1983; Wells 1983) started to pick up on the increasing expansion of developing country 
firms into foreign markets. Frequently, other developing economies (Heenan and Keegan 
1979; Yeung 1994). Beyond the description of the phenomenon, these authors attempted 
to provide explanations on how it was possible that firms born in environments riddled 
with such problems as weak regulatory and judicial systems, extremely limited access to 
credit, high levels of corruption, and limited autochthonous technological capabilities, 
were able to successfully compete in foreign markets where domestic or western MNEs 
would, in principle, enjoy considerable advantages. 
Two broad kinds of theories were offered to explain the new phenomenon. The first one 
was based on domestic country-specific-advantages (CSAs) (Rugman 1980; Dunning 
1989; Porter 1990; Buckley and Casson 1998). In this case, the existence of EMNEs was 
justified by their privileged access to, or control of, internationally scarce natural 
resources or cheap access to generic production inputs, most frequently labor. Privileged 
access to scarce natural resources gave these firms the upper hand in foreign markets 
given the limited availability of alternative suppliers. Cheap domestic labor would allow 
them to implement strategies of input substitution by which intensive use of this cheap 
factor of production would more than compensate for the competitive hurdles they 
encountered in foreign countries. 
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The second set of explanations focused on sources of advantage developed at the firm 
level, frequently referred to as firm-specific-advantages (FSAs) (Rugrnan 1980; Dunning 
1989). Some of these FSAs, it was argued, were developed by firms as a response to 
specific local market conditions (Khanna and Palepu 2006). Frequently mentioned 
examples of these capabilities were the ability of some developing country firms to 
efficiently operate at very small scale levels of production (Wells 1983), or the 
innovations that these firms developed to make up for the unavailability of the "right" 
resources in their home markets (Lecraw 1993). Other FSAs were argued to derive from 
having to compete with developed-country MNEs operating in the EMNEs home country 
(Craig and Douglas 1997; Dawar and Frost 1999; Meyer 2004). The positive 
technological, institutional, managerial and competitive spillovers derived from the 
presence of first world competitors at home helped developing country firms to hone-in 
their capabilities to the extent of making them internationally valuable (see Ghauri and 
Yarning (2009), Meyer (2004) and Rugrnan and Doh (2008) for contrasting perspectives 
on this issue) . Finally, other generic explanations were given to justify the existence of 
EMNEs. Among them, we could cite the opportunities that arose as domestic clients 
ventured abroad, or the provision of added services in a firm's export markets. 
While the literature on EMNEs in the 80s was quite extensive, interest m this 
phenomenon decreased considerably during the following decade and a half. In the early 
2000s, however, a marked increase in the levels ofFDI from developing countries, and a 
flurry of EMNE success stories rekindled the interest of practitioners and academics for 
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these firms (Hoskisson, Eden et al. 2000; Business Week 2006; The Economist 2007). 
Together with this renewed interest came the need for explanations of how it was 
possible that these EMNEs were now not only able to operate in other developing 
countries but also compete head to head with developed country MNEs in their own 
domestic markets. A widely accepted consensus to this question has not been reached yet. 
Some authors argue that the new situation can be comfortably explained with the 
arguments put forth above (Rugman 2009). Others, by contrast, question whether the 
difference between today EMNEs and those in the 80s is a matter of kind and not only of 
degree and whether, consequently, we should be developing a new body of EMNE 
theories. 
In this paper we do not enter in the dispute of whether a new theory is needed to explain 
the factors that make it possible for EMNEs to give their initial steps beyond their home 
markets. Rather, we are interested in finding out how some of these firms have been able 
to sustain their international competitive edge for decades allowing them to become 
major players in their industry at the global level. 
WhyCEMEX? 
CEMEX (Cementos Mexicanos) is the third largest firm in the world, by revenue, 
dedicated to the manufacturing of construction materials and the only major one in its 
industry born in a developing country. With revenues of over $21 billion, 60.000 
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employees and operations in 56 countries in 2008, it ranks 389 in the Global Fortune 500 
ranking. Given the relevance that size has in explaining trends in international trade, FDI, 
and other international business phenomena, performing detailed analysis of how firms in 
these rankings have achieved their world-level status has been a methodology employed 
consistently in IB research. 
In attempting to explain the sustainability of EMNE international competitive advantage, 
we find that the study of CEMEX' s international expansion is particularly enlightening 
for three reasons. First, the very nature of the cement industry, marked by a very low 
value-to-weight ratio, makes international trade in cement the exception rather than the 
rule. Indeed, the high cost of transportation of cement by land limits the competitiveness 
of a cement plant to a radius of about 300 miles (Lafarge 2008). While transportation by 
sea considerably increases the distance that a cement plant can reach competitively, it is 
estimated that over 90% of cement needs are covered by domestic firms. As a 
consequence, cross-national competition in this industry is fought by owning production 
facilities in the countries that the firm intends to serve and by developing strong 
operational and marketing capabilities in those countries. As a corollary, it should be 
noted that the low value of cement relative to its weight makes it virtually impossible to 
compete internationally on the basis of economies of scale in production. That is, while 
increasing the scale of a cement plant certainly lowers the average cost per unit produced, 
the high costs involved in transporting cement more than compensate for the gains 
achieved through large scale production. 
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A second characteristic that makes examining CEMEX' s expansion interesting is that the 
production of cement is not based on scarce and geographically concentrated raw 
materials. The basic ingredients for cement production, limestone and energy, are widely 
available in most relevant markets, ruling out the possibility of a domestic country-based 
source of competitive advantage for any player in this industry. 
One final consideration in examining CEMEX's story is that the cement industry is 
relatively capital intensive and building a significant presence in any major market 
quickly tests the financial muscle of any participant in this industry. The combination of 
these three industry-specific characteristics makes the international expansion of CEMEX 
and its current dominant position quite a puzzling phenomenon for IB. As we have seen 
in the previous section, international expansion of firms from developing countries was 
predicated, mostly, on the existence of one of two circumstances: (!) the exploitation of 
locally abundant and cheap natural or human resources that facilitate attaining substantial 
economies of scale in production, or (2) the control of internationally scarce raw 
materials. Neither of these conditions applies to CEMEX which, in addition, was born in 
an institutional environment where access to credit is, still today, limited at best. The 
question then is: how was it possible for CEMEX to develop the internationally relevant 
operational and marketing FSAs that have made of this company one of the poster 
children of Latin American MNEs? In the following section we review, in broad strokes, 
CEMEX's international expanswn highlighting the gradual acquisition and 
reconfiguration of this company's capabilities as it faced new competitive challenges and 
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as its status changed from small local firm to one of the three main players in the 
construction materials industry in the world. 
CEMEX's expansion history 
The early days 
CEMEX was founded in 1906 in Monterrey as "Cementos Hidalgo" by Lorenzo 
Zambrano, the grandfather of the company's current CEO. CEMEX's early story is 
marked by two main factors: a policy of import substitution applied by Mexican 
govermnents throughout most of the XX century, and a steady growth in its domestic 
market based on acquiring rival firms and integrating them into the company's existing 
operations. While operating in an enviromnent protected from foreign competition 
undoubtedly facilitated the domestic growth of CEMEX, it probably impaired its 
international expansion as it could not benefit from the spillovers generally associated 
with the presence of developed country firms operating in developing countries. 
This relatively comfortable competitive environment that characterized the early days of 
CEMEX came gradually to an end in the mid to late 80s. In preparing to join the GATT 
and laying out the ground work for the signature of NAFT A, the Mexican government 
started to open the country to foreign trade and foreign direct investment. As a result, 
CEMEX's domestic dominance quickly became threatened by the large players in the 
industry, all of which were headquartered in developed countries. It is important to note, 
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however, that the capabilities that the company gained during this period -spotting 
underperforming rivals, acquiring them, and quickly infusing them with a clearly defined 
set of operating and managerial principles- would soon prove to be extremely valuable in 
the international context. 
First foreign ventures 
As its position at home became increasingly threatened, CEMEX's leadership determined 
· that fighting its rivals in Mexico alone would be a losing proposition in the long term: 
while foreign rivals could always finance their Mexican campaign with profits generated 
in their home regions, CEMEX had no such recourse. In what was a bold move for a 
company of its size -$3.8 billion in total assets at the time- and country of origin, 
CEMEX decided to acquire two large Spanish cement companies for $1.8 billion in 1992. 
Strategically, this move was important for two reasons. First, it made CEMEX less 
dependent on Mexico's fate and gave it a dominant position in one of its main rivals' 
important markets. Secondly, it gave CEMEX access to developed-world financial 
resources. Given the capital intensity of this industry, and the underdeveloped state of 
financial markets in Mexico it would not have been possible for CEMEX to continue an 
aggressive international expansion strategy had it not enjoyed the "developed country 
firm" status that came from being a sizeable player in Europe. 
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Upon acquisition of these two firms, CEMEX started to meticulously revise their every 
operational and managerial process in order to realize potential savings, and to quickly 
integrate them into CEMEX's Mexican operations. To their surprise, CEMEX managers 
realized that there were considerably more economies to be realized from the Spanish 
acquisitions than originally thought. In addition, they quickly noticed the importance that 
the Post-Merger Integration process (PMI) might have in future international 
acquisitions. As a result, they started to codify and standardize the different steps 
involved in identifying potential savings in newly acquired firms, rolling out CEMEX's 
standard practices and, very importantly, detecting sources of excellence that might 
represent new best practices for the company as a whole. The next major foreign 
acquisition for CEMEX was in Venezuela where, in 1994, it bought the market leader 
Vencemos. As in the previous case, Venezuela was an important market for CEMEX's 
big international rivals. Also as with the acquisitions in Spain, the PMI process quickly 
improved the profitability of the newly acquired operations. 
At the end of this phase, CEMEX still relied heavily on its domestic regional -NAFTA-
market for about two-thirds of its sales, but had firmly expanded its operations into 
Europe and South America (see Table I). Importantly, it had also enhanced its capability 
platform by gaining access to cheaper and more plentiful sources of capital, codifying 
and standardizing its PMI process, gaining strategic response capacity, and improving its 
operations with new best practices learned from the newly acquired firms. 
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Broadening the geographic scope 
The initial international expansion of CEMEX was followed by a flurry of other foreign 
acquisitions between the mid nineties and the turn of the century. As a result, CEMEX 
expanded its presence to Colombia, Chile, Panama, Costa Rica, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Egypt. The logic behind these expansions was driven by several factors. 
On the one hand, CEMEX looked for markets with large growth potential. In general, this 
was associated with countries experiencing large population growth and a relatively low 
current consumption of cement. Where access to maritime terminals was good, potential 
for growth considerations were made at the regional rather than at the pure country level. 
On the other hand, CEMEX favored acquisitions where it could be a dominant, if not the 
sole, shareholder. Experience showed that speed and the capacity to implement deep 
structural changes in the acquired firms was crucial in capturing the efficiencies that 
CEMEX investors had become accustomed to. This perspective of what was a desirable 
expansion opportunity resulted in CEMEX investing exclusively in developing countries 
and eschewing big and mature markets that were seen at the time as too competitive or 
too expensive to enter. 
Most of the acquisitions during this phase involved only one country at a time and took 
place in a sequential rather than simultaneous manner. This continuous string of 
acquisitions facilitated not only the re-allocation of resources when a PMI team had to be 
put together but also the gradual development of a peculiar culture within CEMEX that 
·emphasized the system-wide dispersion of operational and managerial best practices. 
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Using its headquarters as the center of coordination and control, and supported by a very 
sophisticated IT infrastructure, CEMEX encouraged its managers to explore, analyze and 
report potential new sources of value that had the potential to be applied throughout the 
organization. This was particularly the case during the PMI processes where CEMEX 
managers had first hand exposure to the standard practices of the acquired firms. The 
importance attached to this learning and sharing culture was made evident with the 
launch of the CEMEX Way project in 2000. This $200 million initiative had as its main 
goal the codification ofbest practice knowledge in the company across eight key business 
processes. 
In sum, this second phase was marked by a sequence of acquisitions in developing 
countries whose growth potential derived, mostly, from explosive population growth and 
poor existing infrastructure. In terms of sales, this international expansion more than 
doubled the size of the company between 1995 and 2000, and considerably spread the 
economic risk faced by CEMEX over a larger number of countries. However, it did not 
alter dramatically the regional make up of the company: CEMEX continued to draw most 
of its sales -62%- and even a larger proportion of its profits from North America, but 
enjoyed a solid operation in Europe -15% of total sales- and Latin America -20%-. 
The Big Jump 
Towards the late 90s CEMEX seemed to be running out of potential targets that fit its 
selection criteria. Obvious opportunities seemed to be China, India and Brazil. However, 
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heavy government involvement and exceedingly high valuations of existing plants in 
those countries made CEMEX consider alternative expansion opportunities. 
According to Hector Medina, VP of Finance and Legal, two important changes in the 
way the company looked at potential acquisitions occurred around this time. First, 
CEMEX redefined its strategic unit of analysis from country to regions-within-country. 
This finer segmentation made specific regions within large mature market such as the 
United States look more like developing country opportunities, in terms of their potential 
for growth. Secondly, CEMEX abandoned the lise of profitability as "the" key leading 
indicator to evaluate potential growth opportunities in favor of return on investment. This 
second change, made investing in other segments of the construction materials industry 
such as ready-mix 1 relatively more attractive than investing in cement. 
The new approach would soon materialize in the acquisition of Houston-based 
Southdown for $2.8 billion in 2000. Consistent with the new region-within-country 
approach, Southdown was seen as particularly strong in the states of Texas, Florida, and 
California; three of the fastest growing states in cement consumption in the country. As a 
result of this acquisition, CEMEX became the largest cement manufacturer in North 
America and started to increase its presence in the ready mix market. Small acquisitions 
in Thailand and Puerto Rico in 200 I and 2002 were followed in 2005 by the "monster"2 
acquisition of RMC; a company almost the same size as CEMEX and with operations 
1 Ready-mix is a type of concrete manufactured in hatching plant and delivered to a worksite by truck. The 
main advantage of ready mix over on-site produced concrete is the precision of the mixture. Its main 
handicap is the degree of coordination required between the hatching plant and the worksite. 
2 The acquisition itself was valued at $4.1 billion but the inclusion of debt and other expenses raised the 
cost of the transaction to an estimated $5.8 billion 
Page 114 
spanning various continents and several families of products. RMC's acquisition marked 
a turning point for CEMEX in more than one way. First, CEMEX's sales went from 
depending mainly on developing markets to, in just one stroke, being concentrated on 
mature markets from developed western countries. Secondly, from being a company 
predominantly oriented to the production and commercialization of cement, CEMEX also 
became one of the most prominent global actors in ready-mix and. aggregates. Third, 
CEMEX took on an extremely large amount of debt that made shareholders and investors 
question the wisdom of the deal. This was reflected more directly in the company's stock 
price that feU by 7.21% in the Mexican stock market upon announcement of the deal. 
Lastly, the acquisition of RMC presented a formidable post-merger integration cha11enge 
for CEMEX: not only had it to deliver on expected immediate savings of $200 million a 
year, but also integrate a confederation of independently run operations into the highly 
centra11y coordinated system of CEMEX. To top it off, and as was usual in other PMis, 
the integration team had to be selected from CEMEX existing operations; an effort that 
represented a very significant stretch of the company's organizational resources. Despite 
these considerable obstacles, CEMEX delivered better than anticipated results once 
again: over $40 million in savings were secured within the first three months, and a 
further $360 million in recurring savings were expected to be achieved within three years 
from the date of the acquisition. 
If RMC seemed the pinnacle of CEMEX's acquisition and integration prowess, the 
purchase of Australian Rinker in July 2007, its biggest yet with a price tag of$16 bi11ion, 
would test again the company's capacity to ap1algamate the operations, management 
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styles, and organizational cultures of two large firms. And, once more, CEMEX 
completed the core PMI process in record time and identified over $400 million in 
potential synergies that would be executed over a two-year period. As in occasions past, 
CEMEX strongly leveraged its balance sheet to finance this acquisition. 
The geographic and product diversification achieved by CEMEX through the years 
allowed the company to post strong results in 2007 in spite of record oil prices, and the 
downfall of the construction industry in Spain and the US; two of its most important 
markets. The global financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 hit hard CEMEX 
as well as the other two main players in the industry. However, CEMEX's. heavy debt 
burden has required that a number of exceptional cash generating or cash preserving 
measures be taken. Among others, CEMEX slashed its capital investment budget by more 
than $1.6 billion in 2008, and divested from operations in the US and Spain in 2008 as 
well as from assets in Australia, Austria and Hungary in 2009. In August 2009, however, 
it gained some breathing room by reaching an agreement to restructure a substantial part 
of its $15 billion debt. 
Previous rounds of international expansion transformed CEMEX from a domestic firm to 
an EMNE focused on developing countries with a solid competitive position in the USA 
and Spain. The large acquisitions carried out since 2000, however, led CEMEX to 
compete head to head with developed country MNEs in their own markets. As argued at 
the beginning of the paper, this is a phenomenon that questions extant explanations of the 
existence and sources of competitiveness of EMNEs. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Current theorizing about EMNEs' sources of international competitiveness is still an 
unresolved issue. Some authors argue that the presence of emerging country companies 
beyond their borders is explainable mostly through privileged access to globally scarce 
natural resources or cheap domestic labor (Debrah, McGovern et al. 2000; Aharoni 2009; 
Fleury and Fleury 2009; McCarthy, Puffer et al. 2009). Others, contend that the 
capabilities that developing country firms need to compete internationally only come 
from previous interaction with developed country MNEs operating in their country · 
(Nelson and Pack 1999; Brouthers, O'Donnell et al. 2005; Rugman and Doh 2008; Meyer 
and Sinani 2009; Rugman 2009). Finally, others assert that emerging market firms are 
able to compete abroad as a result of the capabilities developed in response to the 
technological, legal, or marketing challenges they face at home (Uhlenbruck, Meyer et al. 
2003; Khanna and Palepu 2006; Casanova 2009). In either case, focus is generally placed 
on the reasons that allow EMNEs to take their first international steps rather than on how 
this global competitive advantage is sustained. 
Reviewing the international expansion of CEMEX provides us with a potential 
explanation of how an emerging market firm may not only be a "temporary 
multinational" (Wells 2009) but also grow to compete and be a dominant player at the 
global level. Indeed, CEMEX's early experience in acquiring and swiftly integrating 
domestic firms in its existing structure, a keen emphasis on standardization and control, 
expertise in navigating complex institutional environments, and a strong orientation 
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toward shareholder value not only became extremely useful in the company's first 
internationalization efforts but also remained a distinctive trait of CEMEX. Yet, even 
such a remarkable initial capability platform could hardly explain how CEMEX was able 
to compete in markets that considerably differed from Mexico's. CEMEX's international 
expansion conveys a more nuanced story. A story of sustained growth based on the 
exploitation of domestically-grown capabilities that are continuously enhanced from the 
periphery of the firm. New capabilities may arise from specific responses given to 
problems faced in foreign countries, from new technology or management practices 
obtained with the acquisition of a new firm, or simply by gaining access to resources that 
are more plentiful in a foreign location -as with access to developed capital markets . 
when CEMEX acquired its Spanish subsidiaries. The last piece of this capability 
exploitation-enhancement-exploitation story is the strong learning culture in place at 
CEMEX and the development of a set of organizational mechanisms fine tuned to 
analyze, adapt, and roll out to the rest of the organization what is considered to be best 
operational and managerial practices in the industry. 
CEMEX's international expansion is certainly different from that of some of the best 
known "Global Latinas" (Casanova 2009) in at least two respects. First, its growth was 
not based on significant CSAs, or western MNE-learned FSAs. Second, its pattern of 
international expansion reveals CEMEX's FSAs were relevant in various geographic 
regions from the beginning. On both accounts CEMEX runs counter to some of the 
theories put forth to explain the very existence of EMNEs. Whether this company is just 
an outlier or a precursor of a new wave of Latin American MNEs is still to be seen. 
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'. 
Understanding how it was able to transcend its domestic borders and become a global 
leader in its industry, however, is certainly useful for practitioners, and for IB academics 
interested in explaining the growing presence of firms from emerging markets among the 
MNE elite. 
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Table 1- Geographic break up ofCEMEX's sales since the beginning of its international expansion 
No_rt:h Ame.rica 
Mexico 
USA 
Europ_e 
Spain 
UK 
Rest of Europe 
8% 
20% 
centra-!' & s:o-utti· Arrr&rlca·- '9°/o 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Rest of SAMC 
Africa. and Middle East 
Egypt 
Rest of AFME 
~Si<!; 
Australia 
Philippines 
Rest of AS 
Others 
ROW (& adJl!stmari.ti;) 
Tt>taf 
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